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Abstract
Key to the continued growth of the civil Unmanned
Aircraft System (UAS) aviation sector is the devel-
opment of a regulatory framework that will provide
assurances in the management of the risks associated
with their operation. Decisions in relation the evalu-
ation and treatment of aviation risks need to be made
in accordance with the As Low As Reasonably Prac-
ticable (ALARP) framework. There are a number of
concerns in relation to the application of the ALARP
framework to new technologies. This paper explores
these concerns with respect to the risk management
of civil UAS.
A review of the ALARP frameworks defined by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Australia), the
Civil Aviation Authority (United Kingdom) and by
the UK Health and Safety Executive is presented.
This review identified subtle differences that can
have a significant impact on how ALARP frameworks
would be applied to UAS. A number of inconsistencies
in the frameworks were also identified. These issues
aside, it was found that a conceptual application of
an ALARP framework can be made. However, sig-
nificant difficulties were identified in the substantia-
tion of a framework. In particular, the quantification
of the decision criteria for UAS, the handling of un-
certainty, and the identification, characterisation and
representation of societal concerns within a frame-
work. Guidance as to how the dimensions of societal
concern and levels of risk can be jointly considered
within an ALARP framework could not be identified
within the literature. For new technologies such as
UAS, these dimensions can be as significant a factor
in decision-making as that of the quantified measures
of the risk. Due to these deficiencies, there are signif-
icant difficulties in the application and substantiation
of an ALARP framework to the risk management of
new technologies such as UAS.
* Mr BP Williams is on secondment to the Queensland Uni-
versity of Technology from Boeing Research & Technology -
Australia. Email: brendan.p.williams@boeing.com
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1 Introduction
Much research is ongoing in the development of reg-
ulations to facilitate the safe, routine operation of
UAS in civil airspace particularly over populated re-
gions. In accordance with International Civil Avi-
ation Organization (ICAO) Standards And Recom-
mended PracticeS (SARPS), National Airworthiness
Authority (NAA) policy, rule-making, and oversight
activities should be governed by a systematic Safety
Risk Management Process (SRMP) (ICAO 2009). A
general description of the application of the SRMP to
UAS can be found in Clothier & Walker (2013).
A number of frameworks can be used to support
decision-making within the SRMP and in particu-
lar within the risk evaluation and treatment sub-
processes. These decision-making frameworks in-
clude: As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP),
So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP), As
Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), Globale-
ment Au Moins Aussi Bon (GAMAB), Globalement
Au Moins Equivalent (GAME), and Minimum En-
dogenous Mortality (MEM). Discussion on the differ-
ences between these decision-making frameworks can
be found in Johansen (2009). ICAO SARPS stipu-
late that decision making within the SRMP should
be made in accordance with the ALARP framework,
Figure 1.
A review of the different specifications of the
ALARP framework is provided in section §2. An
essential component of the ALARP framework are
the decision criteria that demarcate the different deci-
sion making regions. The definition of these decision
criteria and discussion on the issues associated with
their specification are presented in section §3. Deci-
sion making within the ALARP framework requires
consideration of the level of risk and the degree of so-
cietal concern associated with the operation of UAS.
The societal concerns associated with UAS operations
and their representation in the ALARP framework
are presented in section §4.
2 The ALARP Framework
The ALARP risk decision-making framework is in-
tended to reflect the types of safety decisions made in
everyday life (HSE 1992, 2001b). These decisions are
based on the Level of Risk (LoR) and the degree of
societal concern associated with the particular tech-
nology, activity or situation under assessment. From
Figure 1, a particular situation can be classified as
either:
1. Unacceptable, intolerable or broadly unaccept-
able (§2.1);
2. Tolerable or requiring review (§2.2);
3. Acceptable or broadly acceptable (§2.3); or
4. Negligible.
Central to the classes of tolerable and acceptable risks
is the meaning of ALARP. This is discussed in Section
§2.4. The varying definitions and conditions associ-
ated with each class are described in the following
sub-sections.
2.1 Unacceptable, Intolerable or Broadly
Unacceptable Risk
There are certain activities where people are unwill-
ing to accept a risk regardless of the potential bene-
fits. Situations of this nature have been referred to
as unacceptable, intolerable or broadly unacceptable.
In an effort to simplify terms, this paper will use the
single term unacceptable in place of the various terms
defined in the ALARP frameworks. This will main-
tain consistency with Figure 1 and reduce possible
ambiguity.
ICAO describe an unacceptable LoR as “unaccept-
able under any circumstances, where the probability
and/or severity of the consequences of the hazards are
of such a magnitude, and the damaging potential of
the hazard poses such a threat to the viability of the
organization, that immediate mitigation action is re-
quired” (ICAO 2009). Civil Aviation Safety Author-
ity (CASA) guidance material defines the concept of
an unacceptable LoR as being unacceptable regard-
less of the benefits associated with the activity (CASA
2012).
The conditions associated with a situation deemed
as having an unacceptable LoR can vary. Under the
ICAO specification of the ALARP decision-making
framework, an unacceptable risk must be reduced to
a tolerable level or the activity cannot be undertaken.
Similarly, the ALARP framework defined by CASA
states that risk reduction measures “are essential re-
gardless of cost” (CASA 2009). The CASA frame-
work includes the additional statement that an ac-
tivity assessed as having an unacceptable LoR may
still continue but only where there exists “exceptional
reasons” or “extraordinary circumstances”. The con-
cept of unacceptable LoR defined by the Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK also includes the
additional condition that activities may be allowed
to continue if there are “exceptional reasons” (HSE
2001b). Definitions of an “exceptional reason” or an
“extraordinary” or “extenuating” circumstance are
not provided.
2.2 Tolerable Risk or Risks Requiring Re-
view
For most activities stakeholders are willing to toler-
ate risk in return for certain benefits associated with
the activity. These situations have been described as
tolerable or those “requiring review”. As per Figure 1
and in keeping with our endeavour to simplify terms,
the term tolerable also refers to the concept of “re-
quiring review” as defined in existing frameworks.
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the United
Kingdom (UK) describe a LoR that requires review
as being a LoR where the consequence and/or like-
lihood is of concern (CAA 2010a). CASA and HSE
UK describe a tolerable risk as a risk that people are
generally prepared to tolerate in order to secure ben-
efits (CASA 2012, HSE 2001b). Within these frame-
works, a tolerable risk is further described as a risk
that 1) has been properly assessed and appropriate
measures to control the risk have been implemented,
2) where the residual risk is not unacceptable and is
considered to be ALARP, and 3) will be periodically
reviewed (CASA 2009, 2012, HSE 2001b).
The CAA state that measures to mitigate a risk
to ALARP should be sought for all risks belonging
to the review class (CAA 2010a). Similar conditions
are mandated for tolerable risks in the CASA and
HSE frameworks. Under the ICAO ALARP frame-
work, risks initially assessed as being tolerable do not
require further mitigation provided mitigation strate-
gies already in place guarantee that, to the foreseeable
extent, the probability and/or severity of the conse-
quences of hazards are kept under organizational con-
trol (ICAO 2009). An explicit definition of “organi-
zational control” is not provided.
With the exception of the ICAO framework, all of
the reviewed decision frameworks explicitly associate
the concept of ALARP with the tolerable decision
region. Within the ICAO Safety Management Man-
ual, it is stated that safety risks must be managed
to ALARP. However, an explicit association between
this requirement and the concept of a tolerable risk is
not made.1
For the CAA, CASA and HSE ALARP frame-
works, the concept of a tolerable risk requires more
than the demonstration that the risk is ALARP (e.g.,
it has also been correctly assessed and reviewed, etc.).
2.3 Acceptable or Broadly Acceptable Risk
Often many of the risks in daily life are accepted as
insignificant or trivial, or are accepted because we
have no practical control over them. Situations of this
nature have been referred to as acceptable or broadly
acceptable. In this paper the term acceptable also
refers to the concept of broadly acceptable as defined
in existing frameworks.
The CAA describe an acceptable risk as one where
the occurrence of a “consequence is so unlikely or not
severe enough to be of concern” (CAA 2010a). CASA
and the HSE define the concept of acceptable risks as
those situations where the risks are generally regarded
as sufficiently low, insignificant, and adequately con-
trolled (CASA 2009, 2012, HSE 2001b). ICAO de-
scribes acceptable risks as those that are acceptable
as they currently stand (ICAO 2009).
Under the ICAO framework an activity initially
assessed as having an acceptable LoR requires no ac-
tion “to bring or keep the probability and/or severity
of the consequences of hazards under organizational
control” ICAO (2009). Whereas, under the CASA,
HSE and CAA decision-making frameworks, the re-
duction of an identified risk to ALARP is not aban-
doned; individuals and organisations should continue
1A linkage between the concept of ALARP and tolerable risks is
implied in a number of examples and illustrations throughout the
document; see ICAO (2009).
Figure 1: ALARP Risk Framework
to review and reduce risks wherever it is reasonably
practicable to do so, in those cases where the cost is
insignificant, or where the law so requires it (CAA
2010b, CASA 2009, HSE 2001b). This approach is
consistent with the goal of continual safety improve-
ment wherever practicable (CAA 2010a).
CASA states that detailed working necessary to
demonstrate that risks are ALARP may not be re-
quired for those risks initially assessed as being ac-
ceptable (CASA 2012).
2.4 The Concept of ALARP
Central to the definition of the tolerable decision re-
gion is the concept of a risk being reduced to ALARP.
But what does this mean? CASA and the CAA define
the concept of ALARP as where the risk is low enough
that attempting to make it lower, or the cost of as-
sessing the improvement gained in an attempted risk
reduction, would actually be more costly than any
cost likely to come from the risk itself (CAA 2010a,
CASA 2009). ICAO describes ALARP as the point
where it can be shown that any further risk reduc-
tion is either impracticable or grossly outweighed by
the cost, which requires consideration of the technical
feasibility of further reducing the safety risk, and the
cost (ICAO 2009).
CASA (2009) and the HSE (1992, 2001b) explic-
itly relate the concept of ALARP with the concept of
a gross disproportionality. Specifically, ALARP is the
point where “the cost of reducing the risk is grossly
disproportionate to the benefit gained” (CASA 2009)
and determining that risks have been reduced to a
level as ALARP involves an assessment of the risk to
be avoided, of the sacrifice or costs (e.g., in money,
time and trouble) involved in taking measures to treat
that risk, and a comparison of the two to see if there
exists a gross disproportion (HSE 2001b). The mean-
ing of gross disproportion is further discussed in the
next Section §2.5.
2.5 Gross Disproportionality
CASA (2009) and HSE (2001b) explicitly relate the
concept of ALARP with that of a gross disproportion-
ality between the benefit and costs associated with as-
sessing and implementing measures to further reduce
the risk. A finding of gross disproportionality should
be supported by a cost benefit analysis. Guidance on
the analysis process and the meaning of gross dispro-
portionality can be found in HSE (2001a), Jones-Lee
& Aven (2011) and CASA (2010). It is important to
note that a finding of gross disproportion, on its own,
is not sufficient for a determination of ALARP.
Gross disproportion is typically not represented as
a single value but a range of values expressed on a fi-
nite scale (or ranking), which increases as a function
of increasing risk. The higher the LoR the higher the
ratio of the cost to benefit that is needed to be consid-
ered in gross disproportion; see (HSE 1992, 2001a,b).
In the context of the safety risk management of
civil aviation, a quantified specification of the ratio
of costs to benefit sufficient to constitute gross dis-
proportion could not be identified in the literature.
Even if existing scales were available, they may not
be appropriate for UAS due to differences in the na-
ture of the costs and benefits that need to be eval-
uated (e.g., greater uncertainty in their estimation,
and differences in visibility and equity of the distri-
bution of benefit to people exposed to the risks). A
quantified specification of the condition for gross dis-
proportionality is not necessary to substantiate the
ALARP framework. A determination of gross dispro-
portion can be made qualitatively, thus avoiding the
quagmire of social and political issues associated with
placing a value on different loss outcomes (e.g., a cost
per life saved).
2.6 Summary of Findings
The review has identified subtle differences between
the various specifications of the ALARP decision-
making frameworks available in the literature. These
small differences can have a significant influence on
the risk management of UAS operations. For ex-
ample, in contrast to other specifications, the ICAO
specification of the ALARP framework does not man-
date that all tolerable risks be reduced to ALARP.
Consequently, the LoR associated with an UAS op-
eration can be considered tolerable within the ICAO
ALARP framework but may not be tolerable within
other frameworks. Differences in the associated con-
ditions will also impact the setting of quantitative
safety criteria within the framework. For example,
the ICAO framework may set more stringent risk
criteria to demarcate the region of unacceptable risk
from tolerable risk to account for less stringent con-
ditions on the management of the risks (e.g., not all
tolerable risks need to be mitigated to ALARP). Fur-
ther, National Airworthiness Authorities will need to
determine a common set of high level safety goals
within their respective State aviation safety pro-
grams. For example, the goal for continual safety
improvement will influence the specification of the
ALARP framework and its application to UAS.
A number of deficiencies were also identified. Key
terms are undefined or only loosely defined. For
example, the concepts of “organisational control”
or “exceptional reason”. There are also conceptual
difficulties encountered in the different frameworks.
Within the ICAO Safety Management Manual, it is
stated that safety risks must be managed to ALARP.
This statement conflicts with the definition of the
decision classes of intolerable and acceptable defined
within the ICAO ALARP framework. Further, man-
dating that all risks should be managed to ALARP
conflicts with other requirements defined within the
ICAO ALARP framework (e.g., conflict with the con-
dition that risks initially assessed as being tolerable
do not require further mitigation, described in section
§2.2).
Irrespective of which ALARP framework is to be
adopted, it is clear that the application of the ALARP
framework in the risk management of UAS will re-
quire the assessment of more than the safety risks.
Estimates of the benefit and cost associated with UAS
operations as well as those associated with the risk
management activity itself (e.g., the cost in time and
money to conduct further assessment and evaluation)
need to be made. For new technologies such as UAS
this is very much a “chicken and egg” scenario, where
knowledge of the true benefits and costs may not be
entirely known a priori the operation. There can be
as much uncertainty in the assessment of the benefits
and costs as there is uncertainty in the assessment of
the risks. Whilst there is much research being under-
taken to understand and quantifiably characterise the
safety risks associated with UAS technologies, very
little is being undertaken to characterise the associ-
ated benefits and costs to society.
For some classes of UAS, the primary considera-
tion may not be the safety risks associated with their
operation. The quantified risk analysis conducted by
Clothier et al. (2010), Magister (2010) and Fraser &
Donnithorne-Tait (2011) show that for some types of
UAS and for some UAS operations there is negligible
risk to people and property. For such UAS and UAS
operations the dominating factor driving risk reduc-
tion (a determination of ALARP) are the costs and
associated benefits. It is important to note that the
assessment of the benefit and cost to society requires
more than an assessment of the economic values as-
sociated with the UAS operation (e.g., the economic
loss due to destruction of the unmanned aircraft or
damage to third party property). For example, soci-
ety can place value on a wide range of tangible and
intangible objects (e.g., reputation, trust in technol-
ogy/brand). The gain (benefit) and the loss (cost)
registered to these objects of value need to be consid-
ered in a determination of the ALARP. Finally, one
should also consider the hypothetical and/or actual
costs of not using the technology.
Like risk, there can be a difference between
the cost/benefit assessed by an expert and the
cost/benefit perceived by the different stakeholders.
Whilst there is a wealth of literature exploring the
issues associated with how stakeholders perceive risk,
there is very limited research on the factors influ-
encing stakeholder perception of costs and benefits
within a safety decision making context. This leads
to a plethora of questions, for example:
1. What benefits and costs associated with UAS op-
erations should be considered?
2. Will these need to change for different classes
of UAS or UAS operations? E.g., defence UAS
operations versus civil UAS operations, small
“harmless” UAS versus large UAS.
3. For whom should the benefits and costs be mea-
sured? The operator? A member of the public
exposed to the risk? Society in general?
4. What factors influence stakeholder perception of
the costs and benefits and how should they be
accounted for in the ALARP framework? Will
the concept of gross disproportion change for dif-
ferent stakeholders or situations where there a
significant differences between assessments and
stakeholder perception of the cost/benefit?
Assessments of the costs and benefits and a mea-
sure of the uncertainty associated with the assessment
will be needed in order to apply the ALARP frame-
work. Most disconcerting is that none of the existing
specifications of the ALARP framework provide sub-
stantive guidance on the management of uncertainty
(i.e., its identification, representation, and consider-
ation in decision making). This is a significant issue
for new technologies such as UAS where there is lim-
ited data and operational experience upon which to
base assessments of the risk, cost and benefit. There
are also uncertainties associated with the definition
of the framework itself (e.g., the quantification of de-
cision criteria within the framework).
Figure 2: ALARP Risk Framework
3 Risk Criteria Within the ALARP Frame-
work
High Level Safety Criteria (HLSC) governing the
overall risk management and regulation of UAS oper-
ations have been defined. A detailed review of the
different specifications can be found in Clothier &
Walker (2013). An apparent consensus is that UAS,
as a minimum, must demonstrate a level of safety
equivalent to that of the safety performance cur-
rently demonstrated by Conventionally Piloted Avi-
ation (CPA). This HLSC is commonly referred to as
the Equivalent Level of Safety (ELoS) objective. In
applying the ALARP framework to the safety risk
management of UAS, a linkage between HLSC such as
the ELoS objective needs to be established with the
decision criteria defined within the ALARP frame-
work.
The ELoS objective could be specified in relation
to a number of decision criteria defined within the
ALARP framework (Figure 2). These criteria in-
clude the de manifestis, scrutiny, generally acceptable,
and de minimis criterion and the quantified concept
of gross disproportion. In the next sections we ex-
plore the specification of the risk criteria within the
ALARP framework. The specification of the gross
disproportion criterion is the subject of a future re-
search publication.
3.1 De Manifestis Risk Criteria
The concept of a de manifestis LoR stems from the le-
gal definition of obvious risk and has been described
as the LoR above which a person of ordinary level
of intelligence intuitively recognises as being inher-
ently unacceptable (Fulton 2002, RCC 2007). In the
ALARP framework, the de manifestis LoR distin-
guishes an unacceptable LoR from a tolerable LoR
(Figure 2).2 It is important to note that demonstrat-
ing a LoR less than that of the de manifestis LoR is
not sufficient for the risk to be deemed tolerable (refer
to Section §2.2).
Except under extraordinary circumstances (refer
to Section §2.1), de manifestis risk criteria can largely
be considered as hard criteria (i.e., a rigid boundary
on the decision space, one that must be satisfied).
Therefore, de manifestis risk criteria essentially estab-
lish the minimum safety (or, equivalently, the maxi-
mum unsafe) expectation of civil UAS regardless of
the potential benefit of the operation or whether the
LoR can be practically achieved or not. One could
logically conclude that the ELoS objective for UAS,
which defines the overall minimum safety expecta-
tion for UAS operations, should be associated with
de manifestis risk criteria within the ALARP frame-
work. However, on deeper inspection, this association
may not be appropriate.
Society tolerates the risk associated with CPA op-
erations in return for the substantial and readily iden-
tifiable benefits of, for example, air transportation,
aerial work and flying for recreation. However, soci-
ety tolerates many activities with a higher LoR than
that of passenger jet and turboprop fleet operations,
which are referred to here as Conventional Airline
CPA (CA-CPA). For example, it is widely recognised
that passengers are more likely to die in a motor ve-
hicle accident on their way to an airport than they
are during their time on board a CA-CPA operation.
The level of Individual Risk (IR) of fatality asso-
ciated with road accidents in the UK is estimated as
5.9 × 10−5 fatalities per member of the UK popula-
tion per year (HSE 2001b). This LoR is two orders of
magnitude greater than that associated with CA-CPA
operations, which is estimated to be 2.3× 10−7 fatal-
ities per annum per worldwide population (Clothier
et al. 2013). The point being made here is that soci-
ety readily tolerates the risks associated with motor
vehicles even though the LoR is greater than the LoR
associated with CA-CPA transportation. It can be
concluded that the LoR determined for CA-CPA op-
erations does not reflect the critical LoR above which
society broadly recognises as being unacceptable ir-
respective of its potential benefits (i.e., trade-offs be-
tween risk and benefit are still being made at a LoR
two orders of magnitude greater than the LoR exhib-
ited by CA-CPA operations). Further to this point,
the HSE UK recommends a de manifestis IR of fa-
tality of 1 in 1,000 per annum (1× 10−3 per annum)
for first parties and 1 in 10,000 per annum (1× 10−4
per annum) for third parties (HSE 1992, 2001b). It is
observed that these specifications of de manifestis cri-
teria are more than two to three orders of magnitude
greater than measures of risk determined for current
worldwide CA-CPA operations.
The examples above indicate that society is willing
to make a trade-off between the benefit, cost and risk
for activities with a higher LoR than that currently
exhibited by CA-CPA operations. The specification
of the de manifestis HLSC for UAS should permit sim-
ilar trade-offs to be made for UAS for a comparable
or higher LoR.
Associating the ELoS objective with de mani-
festis criteria within the ALARP framework would be
inconsistent with the fundamental decision scenario
that de manifestis criteria are meant to reflect (i.e.,
a demarcation between those situations where costs
and benefits are not factored into the safety decision
making process). Further, such an association would
2Within the CASA framework, de manifestis criteria are indi-
rectly referred to as basic safety limits (CASA 2009).
establish a minimum LoR requirement on UAS op-
erations that is orders of magnitude above LoR al-
ready tolerated by society for other activities (includ-
ing, for example, sport aviation operations or road
transportation).
A more appropriate basis for specifying the de
manifestis LoR for UAS are existing published reg-
ulatory limits or LoR determined from studies char-
acterising the upper limit of public acceptability of
manmade risks (e.g., CPA, power generation, etc.).
3.2 Generally Acceptable Risk Criteria
Unlike de manifestis LoR criteria, generally accept-
able LoR criteria represent goal LoR. They are soft
requirements that should be satisfied taking into con-
sideration hard practical constraints on the available
technology, on its operation and on the resources
available to mitigate the risks.3
HSE guidelines suggest that the generally accept-
able risk criteria should represent LoR comparable or
lower than the background LoR members of the pub-
lic are readily exposed to in day-to-day life (e.g., to
annual risk of death due to a lightning strike). The
HSE recommends the generally acceptable individual
risk of fatality criterion of one in a million per annum
(1× 10−6 per annum) (HSE 2001b), stating that this
LoR is extremely small compared to the typical back-
ground risk of fatality of one in a hundred per annum
(1× 10−2 per annum) averaged over a lifetime (HSE
2001b). There are a number of social and psycholog-
ical factors that need to be taken into consideration
when making a comparison between the risks associ-
ated with a technology (such as UAS) and the risks
society readily accepts as an inescapable part of life.
The key difference being that exposure to a technol-
ogy is controllable. This difference and other social
and psychological factors are discussed in Section §4.
An alternate approach for specifying generally ac-
ceptable risk criteria is through reference to LoR cur-
rently accepted in society for a similar technology or
industry. In the context of UAS, the generally ac-
ceptable LoR could be specified in terms of the cur-
rent LoR for CPA operations. The CPA LoR can
vary significantly depending on the historical period
of assessment and the type of CPA operation (Cloth-
ier & Walker 2006). For example, the measures of
individual fatality risk due to a midair collision de-
termined by Fulton et al. (2009) clearly show the
variation between the LoR for the aviation sectors
of general aviation, sport, regular passenger trans-
port aviation. This variation in LoR also illustrates
differences in society’s appetite for risk and the dif-
ferent risk-cost-benefit-feasibility trade-offs that exist
for different sectors of the CPA industry (e.g., accept-
ability of risks associated with sport aviation versus
those associated with regular public transportation).
Society is becoming increasingly risk aware (Slovic
1987, Kates & Kasperson 1983, Slovic 1999). Further,
the public believe they are exposed to more risks to-
day than they were in the past and that these risks
will continue to increase (Slovic 1999). With this
increasing awareness comes increasing opposition to
new sources of risk (Slovic 1999), particularly those
associated with new technologies (Kates & Kasperson
1983). In addition, there is the increasing expectation
for assurances in the safety of systems that were pre-
viously considered as of lower societal concern. This
shifting social climate is a challenging environment
3Within the CASA framework, the generally acceptable LoR is
indirectly referred to as the basic safety objective (CASA 2009).
for both the proponents of new technologies and the
authorities charged with their regulation.
Therefore, when considering historical CPA LoR
it is critical to understand that those LoR may only
have been acceptable only in that period and would
be considered very differently today. The acceptable
LoR for aviation that bracketed the start of CPA at
Kitty Hawk was higher than the acceptable LoR that
existed for the USA space program, which is differ-
ent to the acceptable LoR for today’s regular public
transportation and general aviation sectors. An ar-
gument that UAS as a new technology should be af-
forded a grace period with LoR similar to that of the
early CPA era would not be accepted. Society has
evolved generally acceptable risk criteria across the
aviation sector that are independent of new technol-
ogy introductions.
Finally, one must also note the difference between
a goal LoR (i.e., what is aspired to or designed for)
and the actual safety performance demonstrated by
a system. A LoR based on historical CPA accident
and incident data reflects the latter of these measures
and not the goal safety performance for CPA. The
demonstrated safety performance of CPA may far ex-
ceed or fall short of the goal LoR for CPA (i.e., a LoR
deemed generally acceptable for the CPA). CPA ac-
cident and incident data may not provide a suitable
basis for defining the goal LoR (i.e., the generally ac-
ceptable LoR) for UAS within an ALARP framework.
It is more appropriate to specify generally acceptable
risk criteria for UAS in relation to other criteria re-
flecting goal LoR. For example, it would be more ap-
propriate to specify generally acceptable risk criteria
for UAS through reference to the generally acceptable
LoR (a goal LoR) used within an ALARP framework
for a CPA category. If such criteria were not available,
generally acceptable LoR as specified in the ALARP
frameworks for other socio-technical risks could be
used.
3.3 De Minimis Risk Criteria
The de minimis LoR stems from the legal principle
de minimis non curat lex: “the law does not con-
cern itself with trifles” (Fulton 2002, RCC 2007, Pate-
Cornell 1994). The de minimis LoR can be used
within the ALARP framework as a guide for deter-
mining when risks have been managed to a level that
could be considered below general concern, i.e., that a
LoR is approaching negligible risk. Like the generally
acceptable LoR, the de minimis LoR is a goal LoR.
The HSE UK proposes a de minimis risk of individ-
ual fatality of one in ten million per annum (1×10−7
fatalities per annum) (HSE 2001b).
In accordance with the CASA, HSE and CAA-UK
ALARP frameworks, the requirement to continue to
reduce the risks applies regardless of whether the LoR
is considered generally acceptable or not. This is con-
sistent with the overarching goal to continually pur-
sue safety improvement in civil aviation. Therefore,
it is not mandatory that de minimis risk criteria be
defined in the ALARP framework for UAS as mech-
anisms to reduce risk should always be undertaken
until a gross disproportion can be demonstrated.
3.4 Scrutiny Risk Criteria
A reference or scrutiny level is sometimes used to
put newly assessed risks in context with risks that
have been tolerated or broadly accepted in the past
(Clothier & Walker 2013). Scrutiny LoR are not de-
cision criteria but points of reference that allow deci-
sion makers to contrast newly assessed risks against
the management of similar or familiar risks. Scrutiny
lines can exist anywhere in the tolerable or acceptable
regions of the ALARP framework and are often spec-
ified in terms of LoR determined for a similar activity
or industry.
The current levels of risk exhibited by CPA pro-
vide a good reference point against which to contrast
the safety performance of civil UAS. UAS are a vi-
able alternative to CPA in many applications. Such
alternatives should be evaluated in accordance with
the general principles of ALARP. Further, the media
and members of the public are likely to use the cur-
rent safety performance of CPA as a “litmus test” for
UAS (Clothier & Walker 2013), thus a reference LoR
may be a useful tool in communicating the risks to
different stakeholder groups. For these reasons it is
recommended that the ELoS objective be represented
as scrutiny criteria within the ALARP decision mak-
ing framework.
3.5 Impact of Risk Exposure
The preceding discussion on risk criteria has assumed
an equal risk exposure level when comparing different
criteria. This is a natural tendency resulting from bi-
ases such as “worst case thinking” and “availability
heuristic” (Evans 2012), where risk is assessed from a
perspective that the worst outcome will be more likely
and that our measure of risk is biased by recalling
recent similar experiences. The applicability of CPA
risk thresholds to UAS may be an obvious social start-
ing point, but a deeper assessment would reveal that
the exposure of people and property is very much de-
pendent on the specific mission. This point is clearly
illustrated in the quantitative risk analyses conducted
by Weibel (2005), Clothier & Walker (2006), Clothier
et al. (2007), and Dalamagkidis et al. (2009), amongst
others. For CPA, the same variability in exposure is
not encountered as there is always at least one person
exposed to the primary hazards (i.e., the pilot). Dif-
ferent criteria may need to be substantiated within
ALARP framework for UAS.
3.6 Summary
The review of risk criteria within the context of the
ALARP framework has identified that concepts such
as de manifestis LoR, generally acceptable LoR, and
de minimis LoR would adequately define the divides
between unacceptable, tolerable, and acceptable risk
classifications. However, moving beyond the concep-
tual application of the ALARP framework to UAS,
reveals many complications in the actual specifica-
tion of these criteria. This complexity is driven by the
variability of risk tolerance in society both in time and
via the inherent cost/benefit analysis undertaken for
each hazard. This is further complicated when taking
into account the impact of risk exposure, which indi-
cates that the criteria are not static and that direct
comparisons between particular CPA categories and
UAS may not be appropriate.
4 Representing Societal Concern
Discussion thus far has focussed on the decision di-
mension of risk. As illustrated in Figure 1, the
ALARP decision-making framework has an addi-
tional dimension describing societal concern. The
dimension of societal concern reflects the degree of
“socio-political response” (HSE 2001b) to the realisa-
tion of an hazard. It has been stated that the ori-
gin for societal concern is public aversion to certain
characteristics of the hazards concerned (HSE 2001a).
Some characteristic features attracting a higher de-
gree of societal concern include:
1. Lack of familiarity of the hazardous activ-
ity/technology
2. Scale of the detrimental outcomes (e.g., multiple
fatalities or widespread detriment)
3. Prolonged effects
4. Vulnerability of the people impacted by the haz-
ard (e.g., children and the elderly)
5. Lack of equity of the distribution of risks or ben-
efits associated in the activity
6. Involuntariness of exposure
7. Inspiration of dread
(HSE 2001a)
With the exception of the above, the existing litera-
ture provides very little guidance on how these char-
acteristic ‘features’ can be measured or on how they
can be incorporated into the ALARP framework (e.g.,
as criteria to be balanced alongside measures of risk).
General guidance on the consideration of the dimen-
sion of societal concern specific to the safety risk man-
agement of civil aviation could not be identified in the
literature. The following sections provide a brief ex-
ploration of these factors in the context of UAS.
4.1 Representing Societal Concern Due to
Scale of Detrimental Outcomes
Societal concerns arising due to the occurrence of mul-
tiple fatalities in a single event can be characterised
through a measure of the Societal Risk (SR). The
representation of the ALARP framework using SR
measures is provided in Figure 3. Horn et al. (2008)
discussed some of the mathematical foundations of
SR.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the risk decision crite-
ria (e.g., de minimis, de manifestis criteria) are not
represented as a single value but a function of the po-
tential magnitude of loss for a single event. The bar-
rier functions are monotonically-decreasing, reflecting
society’s apparent aversion towards those accidents
with the potential for greater levels of harm (although
there is some debate as to whether it is controllabil-
ity or voluntariness that is causal for this difference
in tolerability; see (Reid 2000)).
Society’s perception of a LoR is largely driven
by the nature and magnitude of the potential con-
sequences, more so than the associated likelihoods of
occurrence. Society tends to be more adverse towards
those potential accidents that have a higher degree of
loss. The magnitude of the potential loss primarily
depends on the nature of the exposure relationship
between the hazard and the population of people at
risk. For example, accidents involving small general
aviation aircraft tend to result in a smaller number
of fatalities than those accidents involving commer-
cial passenger aircraft operations. This is because a
smaller number of people are exposed given the oc-
currence of the hazard. Measures of SR provide an
important tool for accounting for differences in the
“risk portfolio” within an industry or aggregation of
activities (Horn et al. 2008).
Safety criteria expressed in terms of SR are widely
used in the regulation of a diverse range of industries
Figure 3: ALARP Risk Framework Represented Using Measures of Societal Risk
(a review on the use of SR in the European Union for a
range of industries can be found in Trbojevic (2005)).
The HSE states that the “proper regulation of risks
requires that both the individual risks and societal
concerns engendered by a hazard must be addressed”
(HSE 2001b).
The risk profile associated with UAS operations
will be different to that associated with CPA. There
are significant differences between the CPA and UAS
fleets (Palmer & Clothier 2013). In particular, the sig-
nificant diversity in the UAS fleet compared to that
of the CPA fleet. Due to this diversity, the risk pro-
file associated with the UAS fleet is likely to be very
different from that of the CPA fleet. For example, al-
most 70% of the current UAS fleet have a maximum
take-off mass of less than 150 kg (Palmer & Cloth-
ier 2013). Subsequently, the risk profile for the UAS
fleet for the impact of ground collision is most likely
to be characterised by accidents involving a smaller
number of casualties. The SR profile associated with
the hazard of a midair collision involving UAS will
also be different to that of CPA. This is largely due
to the absence of a population of people onboard the
unmanned aircraft who would be exposed to the haz-
ard of a midair collision. For these reasons, measures
of the SR based on CPA accident and incident data
should only be used to define scrutiny barrier func-
tions within ALARP framework for UAS (e.g., for use
as guidance only). Due to differences between classes
within the UAS and CPA fleets (Palmer & Clothier
2013), the scrutiny barrier function for UAS should
be based on a fleet-level aggregation of the safety per-
formance of CPA.
4.2 Representation of Other Aspects of Soci-
etal Concern
Measures of SR do not provide a comprehensive repre-
sentation of the dimension of societal concern. Other
factors influencing societal concern, as mentioned in
§4, are not taken into account (e.g., familiarity, dread,
vulnerability, etc.) by measures of SR.
Some aspects are indirectly captured within the
existing safety risk management framework. The as-
pects of controllability of exposure, voluntary and in-
voluntary exposure, and the distribution of benefits to
those exposed are indirectly taken into account when
making the distinction between the risks posed to
first, second and third parties. More stringent safety
criteria are typically imposed for those hazards that
pose a risk to people whom have limited controllabil-
ity over their own exposure to the hazard, are invol-
untarily exposed, or to those who receive no imme-
diate or readily perceived benefit from the hazardous
activity.
The HSE makes the distinction between workers
(first parties) and members of the public (third par-
ties), proposing different safety criteria for each as
summarised in Table 1. Similar distinctions are made
in the management of safety on defence ranges in
the USA (RCC 2007). In the context of UAS op-
erations, first parties can be identified as those peo-
ple directly associated with the operation of the un-
manned aircraft, i.e., remote pilots and field person-
nel. Third parties are those people over flown by the
UAS who have no direct connection to the UAS op-
eration (e.g., members of the public). In the Com-
mon Risk Management Framework for Airspace and
Air Traffic Management in Australia (DOIT 2012) it
is stated that “safety criteria must be premised on
the basis of the effect on aircrew, other safety critical
staff, the travelling public and the community”. As
evident in this statement, there is the additional cat-
egory of people at risk that must be considered in the
risk management of aviation hazards, secondary par-
ties. In the context of UAS, secondary parties would
be those who are somehow involved or receive benefit
through aviation operations but are not directly as-
sociated with the operation the UAS. An example of
secondary parties would be pilots, crew and passen-
gers on board other aircraft who accept some level of
risk in return for certain benefits (e.g., employment,
transportation, etc.).
It is important to note that for UAS, the primary
risks are to second and third parties, whereas for
CPA the primary risks are to first and second par-
ties (Clothier & Walker 2013). The difference in the
populations at risk must be taken into consideration
when specifying safety criteria for UAS. For example,
it would be inappropriate to use existing safety crite-
ria defined for risks to CPA first parties as a basis for
defining safety criteria for UAS.
An accident can have an impact beyond that of in-
jury to people. Some of these broader losses are indi-
rectly captured in the assessment of the costs as part
of the cost-benefit analysis undertaken for a deter-
mination of gross disproportion. Specifically, ICAO
states that the following cost factors should be con-
sidered as part of the cost-benefit-analysis process:
loss of business, equipment, productivity, managerial,
legal, cultural, market, political and public (ICAO
2009). For UAS, loss of the unmanned aircraft, dam-
age to the environment or property, the loss in earn-
ings and loss of public or client confidence may be par-
ticularly significant for smaller UAS where the LoR
to people is low. Such aspects would be considered as
a secondary concern in the risk management of CPA.
The potential impact on the efficiency of the existing
airspace system is also important consideration.
It is important to note that the scope and magni-
tude of loss associated with an UAS accident, partic-
ularly in the early phases of their operation, can be
amplified. The concept of the social amplification of
risk is described in Kasperson et al. (1993).
4.3 Differences in Social Concern between
Manned and Unmanned Aviation
There will be differences in stakeholder perceptions of
the risks associated with the operation of UAS com-
pared to that of CPA. This will in turn affect the ac-
ceptability/tolerability of the risks and consequently,
the specification of safety criteria for UAS within the
ALARP framework. Clothier & Walker (2013) de-
scribe a number of factors that may lead to differences
in the perception and in turn acceptability of UAS op-
erations compared to that of CPA operations. These
factors include the visibility of the benefits, volun-
tariness, control, and the knowledge and information
available to stakeholders. Other general factors that
can influence public perception of risks are described
in Slovic (1987). Directly adopting existing risk crite-
ria (e.g., generally acceptable criteria) for CPA may
not reflect differences in stakeholder perceptions and
preferences in relation to the risks associated with
UAS technologies.
As discussed previously, it is important to note
that stakeholder perception and preferences towards
UAS technologies will also change with time. It is
likely that stakeholders will have a heightened sensi-
tivity towards the risks while UAS remain a new and
unfamiliar technology. This is a common situation for
new technologies, as described by Melchers (2001):
History suggests that a new technology will
only survive if it has no major catastrophes
early in its development.
Community attitudes towards the safety of UAS
technologies are likely to change as stakeholders be-
come more accustomed with the technology, more
familiar with its associated risks and benefits, and
as more information becomes available to regulators
(i.e., trust). Further, the nature of the risks associ-
ated with the UAS industry will change as the sector
grows and as new applications for the technology are
identified and exploited.
The specification of safety criteria for UAS will
need to reflect the initial sensitivity of stakeholders
to new and unfamiliar technologies and the changing
nature of the risks presented by UAS. Safety criteria
will also need to reflect the objective for continued
safety improvement as stipulated in the ICAO States’
Safety Plan (SSP) (ICAO 2009). It can be concluded
that the substantiation of the ALARP framework for
UAS will need to be periodically revised to account
for differences in stakeholder perceptions and prefer-
ences, changes in the risk profile associated with UAS
operations, and to satisfy the objective for continued
safety improvement as defined in the SSP.
Finally, different stakeholders will have different
concerns. It cannot be assumed that the set of safety
criteria defined in the ALARP framework are neces-
sarily representative of all stakeholder perspectives.
4.4 Summary of Societal Concern
This section has only briefly touched on the dimen-
sion of societal concern within the ALARP frame-
work. The most significant finding of this review is
that the literature provides very little guidance as to
this dimension and its incorporation into the ALARP
framework.
With the exception of some high level discussion
presented in Clothier & Walker (2013), no existing
literature could be identified which specifically ad-
dressed the impact of societal concerns on the safety
risk management and in turn regulation of UAS tech-
nologies. Addressing societal concerns will be a signif-
icant factor in the safety risk management and deci-
sion making for UAS, particularly in the early phases
of the introduction of the technology. A number of
factors influencing societal concern have already been
identified but there is almost no guidance as to how
these factors can be taken into consideration in the
ALARP framework. Measures of SR and accounting
for differences in the voluntariness of the exposure do
not account for all of these factors. Further research
to identify, characterise and incorporate societal con-
cerns in the risk management of UAS is needed.
5 Conclusions
This paper has set out to identify and explore the
issues of applying the As Low As Reasonably Prac-
ticable (ALARP) decision-making framework to the
risk management of UAS. It was found that there are
subtle differences between the different specifications
of the ALARP framework made in safety literature.
Inconsistencies in the existing frameworks were also
identified. These subtle differences and inconsisten-
cies can have significant impact on how the ALARP
frameworks are to be substantiated for the risk man-
agement of UAS. A single, consolidated framework,
should be adopted by the aviation safety community.
A conceptual application of the ALARP frame-
work can be made using de manifestis LoR, generally
acceptable LoR, and de minimis LoR as the boundary
definitions between Unacceptable, Tolerable, Accept-
able, and Negligible. However, significant difficulties
were identified in the substantiation of the ALARP
framework. In particular, in the specification of the
ALARP decision criteria and the identification, char-
acterisation, and representation of societal concerns.
Difficulties in relation to the specification of the
ALARP decision criteria arise due to a number of
factors, including:
1. Differences in the primary populations at risk,
which in turn creates a difference in the nature
of the exposure and the acceptability of the risks.
Decision Criteria Population Individual Risk of Fatality per Annum
De manifestis Workers 1× 10−3
De manifestis Members of the public 1× 10−4
Broadly acceptable Workers and members of the public 1× 10−6
Table 1: Individual Risk (IR) of fatality criteria for different populations at risk (HSE 2001b)
2. Unique systems and missions for which there are
no CPA equivalents.
3. Differences in how society perceives the risks and
benefits associated with new technologies such as
UAS compared to that for established and famil-
iar technology such as CPA. This in turn influ-
ences society’s appetite for risk.
4. The time sensitivity of the acceptability of the
risks associated with new technologies.
5. Additional uncertainties that need to be incor-
porated in the cost benefit analysis for UAS (to
support a finding of gross disproportion)
Guidance as to how the dimensions of societal con-
cern and levels of risk can be jointly considered within
the ALARP framework could not be identified in the
literature. In the case of new technologies, such as
UAS, the dimension of societal concern can be as sig-
nificant a factor in decision making as that of the
quantified measures of the risk. Further research on
the impact of social dimensions on risk thresholds, be-
yond the quantification of risk, is required. Decision
making requires not only an appreciation of the risk
but how individuals and society respond to that risk.
Finally, none of the existing specifications of the
ALARP framework provide substantive guidance on
the management of uncertainty. This is a significant
issue for new technologies such as UAS where there is
limited data and operational experience upon which
to base assessments of the risk, cost and benefit.
In considering these deficiencies it is concluded
that there are significant difficulties in the application
and substantiation of the ALARP framework to the
risk management of new technologies such as UAS.
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